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SUMMARY
Mr. Nguyen was not required to marshal his challenge to the trial court's legal
conclusion but even if marshaling was necessary, the requirement was met. Mr.
Nguyen's argument that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial also
did not require him to marshal the evidence as he was not challenging a finding of fact.
A mistrial was warranted where the prosecutor's improper comments on Mr. Nguyen's
decision not to testify were meant to bolster the sole material witness' credibility and
focus the jury on Mr. Nguyen's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt. Where the
issue of guilt or innocence lies solely with the testimony of the child witness, adherence
to the rights and rules designed to sift truth from error is critical.
i

POINT I. MR. NGUYEN CHALLENGES THE TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL
CONCLUSION AND THEREFORE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
MARSHAL BUT EVEN IF MARSHALING WAS NECESSARY, THE
REQUIREMENT WAS MET.
Mr. Nguyen argued in his opening brief that the trial court failed to comply with
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-411, Utah Rule of Evidence 15.5 and 403

before admitting the videotaped interview into evidence at trial. See Aplt. Opening Brief
9-17. Whether the trial court correctly admitted the videotape under these provisions is a
question of law. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also
State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ^[11, 218 P.3d 610 ("[T]he interpretation of a rule of
procedure is a question of law that we review for correctness.") (quotation and citation
omitted); State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, Tf6, 73 P.3d 978 ("Statutory
interpretation is a matter of law, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness."). The
State is attempting to escape review of the merits by arguing that Mr. Nguyen was
required to marshal the evidence or that he inadequately briefed. See Appellee Brief 1326. The State's argument is unsupported.
The issue before the Court is whether the trial court erred in admitting the
videotape without making the required statutory determination that good cause existed,
that the best interests of justice were served and that probative value of the tape
outweighed any unfair prejudice. See Aplt. Opening Brief 9-17. The issue requires this
Court to interpret Utah Code Ann. §76-5-411 and Utah Rule of Evidence 15.5 and
determine whether the trial court failed to make those required findings. Mr. Nguyen's
argument in relations to the trial court's findings is that those required to support good
cause and best interests were not made as mandated by the statute and rule. Because Mr.
Nguyen's arguments only address the legal sufficiency of the findings under the
applicable statute and rule, marshaling is not required. See Utah R. App, P. 24(a)(9) ("A
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding.").
2

Even if the State were correct and Mr. Nguyen's argument did require him to
marshal, that requirement was met where Mr. Nguyen "summarize[ed], or ;marshal[ed]'"
the State's arguments for the videotapes admission. See Aplt Bri6f 13-16. Furthermore,
"the marshaling requirement is not a limitation on the power of the appellate courts" and
this Court has the discretion to reach the merits of issues where the duty to marshal the
evidence is imposed but not met. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42,1fl[18-21, 164 P.3d 384 (noting the marshaling
requirement is "not, itself, a rule of substantive law"). In addition, the State's assertion
that the issue was inadequately briefed is without merit as Mr. Nguyen supported his
argument with the appropriate statute, rules and applicable case law. See Aplt. Brief 917. Therefore, this Court should reach the merits of Mr. Nguyen's argument that the trial
court improperly admitted the videotaped testimony into evidence.
The State further misinterprets Mr. Nguyen's argument regarding the prejudice he
suffered as a result of having the videotape testimony admitted. The prejudice does not
stem from Mr. Nguyen's choice not to cross-examine the child witness but from the
needless cumulative presentation and bolstering of the witness' testimony. See Aplt.
Brief 14-17; Utah R. Evid. 403. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, this video was
needlessly cumulative of the child witness's testimony and there was no need to admit it
given the witness's ability to testify on the stand completely and "articulate[ly]"
regarding her allegations. The presentation of this video to the jury followed by the
witness's testimony relating the allegations of abuse a second time was prejudicial and
substantially outweighed any probative value it may have had. Utah R. Evid. 403.
3

POINT II. MR. NGUYEN'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL AFTER THE
PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS VIOLATED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION DID NOT REQUIRE MARSHALING BUT
PREJUDICED MR. NGUYEN REQUIRING REVERSAL.
As noted above Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) only requires a party to
"marshal all record evidence" when that party is "challenging a feet finding." See Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Mr. Nguyen's argument that the trial court erred in failing to grant a
mistrial after the prosecutor's indirect comments on his decision not to testify violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination resulting in prejudice does not fit under
the State's ubiquitous attempts to expand the marshaling requirement to avoid review of
the issues on the merits. The prosecutor's several implicit references on Mr. Nguyen's
failure to testify prejudiced him necessitating a new trial.
Contrary to the State's assertions, the prosecutor in this case was not merely
"argu[ing] the strength of the prosecution's case," but attempted to bolster the child
witness's credibility at the expense of Mr. Nguyen's choice not to testify. The
prosecutor's comments were not aimed at "fairly responding to an argument of the
defendant" or in response to claims by Mr. Nguyen that he was not "afforded" the
opportunity "to explain his side of the case" like the defendant in United States v.
Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988), the case cited by the State to support the prosecutor's
prejudicial comments. Instead, "the prosecutor on his own initiative ask[ed] the jury to
draw an adverse inference from [Mr. Nguyen's] silence" which case law clearly holds
violates "the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Robinson, 485 U.S. at 32
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(noting the prosecutor is prohibited "from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the
defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt").
Many cases involving allegations of child sexual abuse, like this one, hinge on the
credibility of a child witness. Seldom can physical evidence be offered to refute the
allegation of sexual abuse. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, «|[12, 992 P.2d 951
(recognizing the evidentiary difficulties that confront a defendant in litigating these types
of cases ). In such cases, it is critical that "the governing evidentiary and procedural rules
designed to enable a trier of fact to sort out truth from falsehood . . . be applied with
punctiliousness to avoid factual error and injustice." Id ^[14. Additionally,
"[p]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all improper tactics." Id. <p 1 (quotation and
citation omitted). "It is as much [a prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
In this case, the prosecutor "call[ed] the jurors' attention to matters not proper for
their consideration and [those] comments ha[d] a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the
jury by significantly influencing its verdict." State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ^[18, 8 P.3d
1025. The prosecutor's comments exceeded the limits of permissible comment in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The cumulative error of this violation together with
the improper admission of the videotaped testimony of the sole material witness
substantially prejudice Mr. Nguyen resulting in an unfair trial. State v. Havatone, 2008
UTApp 133,^8, 183P.3d257.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and more fully set out in Appellant's opening brief,
Mr. Nguyen respectfully requests this Court to reverse his convictions and remand for a
new trial.
SUBMITTED this _ \ _ day of June, 2010.

DEBRA M. NELSON
STEPHEN W. HOWARD
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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